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Abstract—Random key graphs have received considerable
attention and been used in various applications including secure
sensor networks, social networks, the study of epidemics, crypt-
analysis, and recommender systems. In this paper, we investigate
a q-composite random key graph, whose construction on n
nodes is as follows: each node independently selects a set of
Kn different keys uniformly at random from the same pool of
Pn distinct keys, and two nodes establish an undirected edge
in between if and only if they share at least q key(s). Such
graph denoted by Gq(n,Kn, Pn) models a secure sensor network
employing the well-known q-composite key predistribution. For
Gq(n,Kn, Pn), we analyze the probabilities of Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
having k-connectivity, k-robustness, a Hamilton cycle and a per-
fect matching, respectively. Our studies of these four properties
are motivated by a detailed discussion of their applications to
networked control. Our results reveal that Gq(n,Kn, Pn) exhibits
a sharp transition for each property: as Kn increases, the
probability thatGq(n,Kn, Pn) has the property sharply increases
from 0 to 1. These results provide fundamental guidelines
to design secure sensor networks for different control-related
applications: distributed in-network parameter estimation, fault-
tolerant consensus, and resilient data backup.
Index Terms—Random key graphs, networked control, robust-
ness, Hamilton cycle, perfect matching.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random key graphs [4], [5] originally resulted from the
modeling of secure sensor networks [6], [7], and have also
been used in other applications including social networks [8],
the study of epidemics [9], cryptanalysis [10], recommender
systems [11], and circuit design [12]. The usual definition of
a random key graph with n nodes is as follows [4], [5]: each
node independently picks a set of Kn different cryptographic
keys uniformly at random from the same pool of Pn distinct
keys, and an undirected edge is put between any two nodes
which share at least one key. In this paper, we consider a
more general model than the usual notion above. Specifically,
we generalize the definition by requiring two nodes having an
edge in between to share at least q key(s) rather than just one
key, where q is a positive number. We call this general model
as a q-composite random key graph and use Gq(n,Kn, Pn) for
the notation. Clearly, our model in the special case of q = 1
reduces to the above traditional notion of random key graph
[4], [5]. To motivate our study of Gq(n,Kn, Pn), we discuss
its applications to secure sensor networks and social networks.
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Applying random key graphs to secure sensor networks.
We explain that (q-composite) random key graphs can be used
to model secure sensor networks. For wireless sensor networks
deployed in hostile environments, cryptographic protection is
needed to ensure secure communications. Random key predis-
tribution [7] has been introduced as a suitable security scheme.
The first random key predistribution scheme, proposed by
Eschenauer and Gligor [7], works as follows. For a network
of n sensors, before deployment, each sensor is assigned a
set of Kn distinct cryptographic keys selected uniformly at
random from the same key pool containing Pn different keys.
After deployment, two sensors establish secure communication
if and only if they have at least one common key. Chan et
al. [6] extend the Eschenauer–Gligor (EG) scheme to the so-
called q-composite key predistribution scheme, by requiring
two sensors to share q key(s) rather than just one key for secure
communication. Clearly, a secure sensor network employing
the q-composite scheme induces a topology modeled by a
q-composite random key graph, while the induced topology
under the EG scheme is represented by a traditional random
key graph (i.e., a q-composite random key graph in the case
of q = 1).
Applying random key graphs to social networks. In
addition to secure sensor networks, random key graphs can
also used to model social networks [8]. To see this, we observe
that the concept of “cryptographic key” in constructing a q-
composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) can be general-
ized to any object or interest (e.g., watching a video, listening
to a song, or reading a novel). Then Gq(n,Kn, Pn) with
nodes representing individuals naturally models an interest-
based social network, where a link between two people is
represented by their selection of at least q common interests,
after each of them chooses Kn interests from the same pool
of Pn interests.
To consider more control-related applications, we will
mainly focus on using q-composite random key graphs for
secure sensor networks instead of social networks. Our stud-
ied properties of q-composite random key graphs include k-
connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton cycle containment, and
perfect matching containment. We explain their definitions
below and will detail their applications to networked control
later in Section II.
First, k-connectivity means that each pair of nodes can find
at least k internally node-disjoint path(s) in between [13],
[14]. An equivalent definition of k-connectivity is that after
the removal of at most (k − 1) nodes, the remaining graph
is still connected [13], [14]. Second, k-robustness introduced
by Zhang et al. [15] quantifies the effectiveness of local-
information-based consensus algorithms in the presence of
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the Hamilton-cycle-based distributed in-network parameter estimation by Rabbat and Nowak [3].
malicious nodes. More formally, a graph with a node set V
is k-robust if at least one of (a) and (b) below is true for
every pair of non-empty, disjoint subsets A and B of V : (a)
there exists no less than one node va ∈ A such that va has
at least k neighbors inside V \A; and (b) there exists no less
than one node vb ∈ B such that vb has at least k neighbors
inside V \ B. Third, a perfect matching in a graph with an
even number of nodes means a matching covering all nodes,
where a matching in a graph is a set of edges without common
nodes [16]. Finally, a Hamilton cycle in a graph is a closed
loop that visits each node once [17].
The above four properties are all monotone increasing. In
this paper, we study these properties and show their sharp
transitions in a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We obtain exact probabilities of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) being k-
connected, having at least one Hamilton cycle, and having at
least one perfect matching, respectively. We also derive a zero–
one law for k-robustness in Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
• Our studies of the above four properties are motivated
by a detailed discussion of their applications to networked
control (see Section II). Our results show that Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
exhibits a sharp transition for each property: as Kn increases,
the asymptotic probability that Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has the prop-
erty sharply increases from 0 to 1. These results provide
fundamental guidelines to design secure sensor networks for
different control-related applications: distributed in-network
parameter estimation, fault-tolerant consensus, and resilient
topology control (see Section II).
• To further quantify the sharpness of the transition, we derive
the transition width of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) for different properties
above, where the transition width measures how should Kn
grow to increase the probability of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) having
certain property from ǫ to 1 − ǫ for ǫ < 12 . We demonstrate
different transitional behavior of the transition width for q ≥ 2
and q = 1 when Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is applied to model secure
sensor networks: the transition width can be very small (even
0 or 1) for q = 1, while no such phenomenon exists for
q ≥ 2. This result shows a fundamental difference between
the q-composite scheme with q ≥ 2 and the EG scheme (i.e.,
the q-composite scheme with q = 1), and can be used to design
secure sensor networks; e.g., the q-composite scheme with
q ≥ 2 is preferred over the EG scheme if it is desired to have
stronger resilience of k-connectivity against key revocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the
applications of our study to networked control in Section II.
Afterwards, Section III presents the transitional behavior in
the probability of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) having each property, and
Section IV investigates the transition width of Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
for different properties. We compare this paper with related
work in Section V. Section VI provides technical details.
II. APPLYING THE STUDIED PROPERTIES OF RANDOM
KEY GRAPHS TO NETWORKED CONTROL
Below we discuss the applications of the studied properties
in random key graphs to networked control.
A. Hamilton Cycle for Distributed Parameter Estimation
Hamilton cycle has been used to facilitate distributed in-
network parameter estimation in a seminal work of Rabbat
and Nowak [3], as detailed below.
In many sensor network applications, sensors often measure
quantities such as temperature, pressure, water salinity, vibra-
tion amplitude [18]. The eventual goal is to estimate environ-
mental parameters from the “raw” measurements. To achieve
this goal, distributed in-network processing is preferred over a
centralized approach (where a fusion center collects data from
sensors), since the former makes more efficient use of sensors’
limited communication and energy resources.
An algorithm for distributed in-network parameter estima-
tion is proposed by Rabbat and Nowak [3]. The algorithm is
based on a Hamilton cycle and its basic idea is as follows. An
estimate of certain environmental parameter is passed from
node to node on the Hamilton cycle. Specifically, along the
way each node updates the parameter based on its environ-
mental measurements, and then passes the updated estimate
to the next node. It may require several iterations through the
Hamilton cycle to obtain the final solution.
The Hamilton-cycle-based algorithm of [3] can be formally
described as follows. Without loss of generality, assume that
sensors are numbered by 1, 2, . . . , n so that the network has
a Hamilton cycle given by 1∼∼2∼∼ . . .∼∼n∼∼1, where “∼∼”
represents a link. As computing the final estimate may require
several iterations through the Hamilton cycle, we look at one
iteration (say iteration k) for illustration. In the kth iteration,
sensor i receives an estimate ψi−1,k of θ from sensor i − 1,
and makes an adjustment to θ based on its measurement(s)
xi and its local cost function fi(θ, xi). After the adjustment,
the estimation of θ by sensor i is ψi,k, as illustrated inside
the rounded rectangle of Figure 1. From the end of the kth
iteration to the beginning of the (k + 1)th iteration, sensor n
sends its estimate ψn,k ≡ ψ0,k+1 of θ to sensor 1, and sensor 1
adjusts the estimation of θ based on its measurement(s) x1 and
3its local cost function f1(θ, x1). This begins the (k+1)th iter-
ation, as shown in Figure 1. In terms of the local adjustments,
Rabbat and Nowak [3] consider a gradient descent-like rule
and demonstrate its fast convergence.
If the goal of the distributed data processing is to compute
the average of sensors’ measurements, each fi can take
the quadratic cost function, and the desired average can be
obtained after only one iteration. However, more general
optimization problems require several “rounds” through the
network to obtain a solution [3]. Hence, the algorithm depends
on finding a cycle that touches each sensor once, and such a
cycle is precisely a Hamilton cycle. As explained, this cycle
is 1∼∼2∼∼ . . .∼∼n∼∼1, where each number indexes a sensor.
As explained in Section I, the q-composite random key
graph represents the topology of a secure sensor network under
the renowned q-composite key predistribution scheme [6].
Then our zero–one law and exact probability results on Hamil-
ton cycle containment in q-composite random key graphs
provide a precise guideline for setting parameters of the sensor
network to ensure the existence of a Hamilton cycle, which
enables distributed in-network parameter estimation.
B. k-Connectivity for Resilient Topology Control and Fault-
Tolerant Consensus
We explain the applications of k-connectivity below. First,
k-connectivity enables resilient topology control against node
or link failure, since k-connectivity means that connectivity is
preserved even after at most (k− 1) nodes or links fail. In the
application of q-composite random key graphs to secure sensor
networks in hostile environments, k-connectivity is particularly
useful for resilient topology control since sensors or links
can be compromised by an adversary [6], [19]. Second, k-
connectivity is useful to achieve fault-tolerant consensus in
networks, as discussed below. Sundaram and Hadjicostis [18],
and Pasqualetti et al. [20] show that being (2h+1)-connected
for a network is the necessary and sufficient condition to
ensure that consensus can be reached even if there exist h
malicious nodes crafting messages to disrupt the protocol.
C. k-Robustness for Fault-Tolerant Consensus
As explained in the previous subsetion, if the network is
sufficiently connected, resilient consensus can be achieved.
For this, several algorithms have been proposed in the liter-
ature [18], [20]. However, these algorithms typically assume
that nodes know the global network topology, which limits
application scenarios [21]. To account for the lack of global
topology knowledge in the general case (for example, each
node knows only its own neighborhood), Zhang and Sun-
daram [15] propose the notion of graph robustness defined
as follows. A graph with a node set V is said to be k-robust
if at least one of (a) and (b) below holds for every pair of
non-empty, disjoint subsets A and B of V : (a) there exists at
least a node va ∈ A such that va has no less than k neighbors
outside A (i.e., inside V \ A); and (b) there exists at least a
node vb ∈ B such that vb has no less than k neighbors outside
B (i.e., inside V \B).
Zhang et al. [15] show that k-robustness implies k-
connectivity, while k-connectivity may not imply k-robustness.
Based on [15], [21], we will explain that k-robustness quanti-
fies the effectiveness of local-information-based fault-tolerant
consensus algorithms in the presence of adversarial nodes.
To discuss consensus, we suppose that all nodes are syn-
chronous and the time is divided into different slots. Each node
updates its value as time goes by. Let xi[t] denote the value of
node vi at time slot t for t = 0, 1, . . .. For simplicity, we first
consider the case where all nodes are benign. Then consensus
can be defined by limt→∞ |xi[t]− xj [t]| = 0 for each pair of
nodes vi and vj . Each node updates its value in each time
slot based on the following process. With Vi denoting the
neighborhood set of each node vi, then vi updates its value
xi[t] to xi[t+1] from time slot t to t+1 by incorporating every
neighbor vj’s value xj [t] that vj sends to vi; i.e., there is a func-
tion fi(·) such that xi[t+ 1] = fi
({
xj [t]
∣∣ vj ∈ Vi ∪ {vi}}).
In linear consensus [15], [21], each fi(·) is a linear function
that assigns appropriate weights to its inputs to compute a
weighted summation.
Now we consider the presence of adversarial nodes; i.e.,
there exist nodes who maliciously deviate from the nominal
consensus protocol. Recall that a benign node vi sends xi[t]
to all of its neighbors and applies fi(·) at every time slot t.
In contrast, a malicious node does not follow this protocol;
in particular, a malicious node may try various ways (e.g.,
crafting bad values) to disrupt the consensus evolution. In the
presence of malicious nodes, consensus means limt→∞ |xi[t]−
xj [t]| = 0 for each pair of benign nodes vi and vj .
Assuming each node does not know the global network
topology and only knows the number of malicious nodes in
its neighborhood, Zhang and Sundaram [21] demonstrate the
usefulness of robustness in studying consensus. Specifically,
under the adversary model that each benign node has at most
h malicious nodes as neighbors, if the graph is (2h+1)-robust,
consensus can be achieved according to an algorithm where
each node updates its value at each time slot using the values
received from its neighbors (see [21] for the algorithm details).
Given the above, in secure sensor network applications of q-
composite random key graphs, our k-robustness result provides
guidelines of setting parameters for fault-tolerant consensus.
D. Perfect Matching for Resilient Data Backup
Recently, Tian et al. [22] have used perfect matching to
design resilient data backup in sensor networks. The moti-
vation is that on the one hand, sensors deployed in harsh
environments are prone to failure, while on the other hand,
data generated by sensors may need to be kept for an extended
period of time. The work [22] proposes to back up each
regular sensor’ data in a randomly selected set of robust
sensors. The goal of the data-backup scheme is to ensure that
even under the failure of regular sensors and a large portion
of robust sensors, accessing the remaining small fraction of
robust sensors can recover all the data. Then [22] reduces
the above requirement to the existence of a perfect matching
in some random graph model. Afterwards, the condition for
perfect matching containment is used to derive the number of
robust sensors required by a regular sensor.
4We have discussed the applications of k-connectivity, k-
robustness, Hamilton cycle containment and perfect matching
containment. Next, we present results on transitional behavior
of these properties in q-composite random key graphs.
III. TRANSITIONAL BEHAVIOR OF
q-COMPOSITE RANDOM KEY GRAPHS
Clearly, each of k-connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton cy-
cle containment and perfect matching containment is a mono-
tone increasing graph property. For each n, given Pn, the prob-
ability that a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
has a monotone increasing property increases as Kn increases
[23]. The reason is that stochastically speaking, increasing Kn
means adding more edges to Gq(n,Kn, Pn) as the probability
of an edge existence between two nodes increases. With I
denoting one of k-connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton cycle
containment, or perfect matching containment, if Kn = 0,
then Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is an empty graph and thus has property
I with probability 0; if Kn = Pn, then Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is
an complete graph and thus has property I with probability
1 (for all n sufficiently large); and if Kn increases from 0
to Pn, the probability of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) having property I
increases from 0 to 1, so there is a transition. In what follows,
our Theorem 1 on k-connectivity, Theorem 2 on k-robustness,
Theorem 3 on Hamilton cycle containment, and Theorem 4 on
perfect matching containment, show that q-composite random
key graphs exhibit sharp transitions for these properties.
A. Results of q-composite random key graphs
We present the main results in Theorems 1–4 below. The
comparison between them and related results in the literature is
given in Section V. In this paper, all asymptotics and limits are
taken with n →∞. We use the standard asymptotic notation
o(·), O(·), ω(·),Ω(·),Θ(·); see [5, Page 2-Footnote 1]. Also,
P[·] denotes an event probability.
Theorem 1 below gives the asymptotically exact probability
for k-connectivity in Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Theorem 1 (k-Connectivity in q-composite random key graphs
with improvements over the conference paper [24]). For a
q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), if there is a
sequence αn with limn→∞ αn ∈ [−∞,∞] such that
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ αn
n
, (1)
then we have
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-connected. ]
= e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! (2)
=

0, if limn→∞ αn = −∞, (3a)
1, if limn→∞ αn =∞, (3b)
e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! , if limn→∞ αn = α∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), (3c)
under
Pn =
{
Ω(n), for q = 1,
ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
, for q ≥ 2. (4)
Theorem 1 shows that q-composite random key graphs
exhibit sharp transitions for k-connectivity. In particular, it
suffices to have an unbounded deviation of αn in (1) to ensure
that Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-connected with probability 0 or 1,
where αn measures the deviation of
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
from the critical
scaling
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn
n as given by (1). From [24], the term
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
in (1) is an asymptotic value of the edge probability.
Theorem 2 below gives a zero–one law for k-robustness in
a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn). Since the
interpretations of Theorems 2–4 will be similar to that of
Theorem 1 above, we omit the details to save space.
Theorem 2 (k-Robustness in q-composite random key graphs).
For a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), if there
is a sequence βn such that
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ βn
n
, (5)
then it holds that
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-robust. ]
=
{
0, if limn→∞ βn = −∞, (6a)
1, if limn→∞ βn =∞, (6b)
under
Pn =
{
ω
(
n(lnn)5
)
, for q = 1,
ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
. for q ≥ 2. (7)
Theorem 3 (resp., Theorem 4) below gives the asymptoti-
cally exact probability for Hamilton cycle containment (resp.,
perfect matching containment) in Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Theorem 3 (Hamilton cycle containment in q-composite
random key graphs). For a q-composite random key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn), if there is a sequence γn with limn→∞ γn ∈
[−∞,∞] such that
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ ln lnn+ γn
n
, (8)
then it holds under (7) that
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) contains a Hamilton cycle. ]
= e−e
− limn→∞ γn
(9)
=

0, if limn→∞ γn = −∞, (10a)
1, if limn→∞ γn =∞, (10b)
e−e
−γ∗
, if limn→∞ γn = γ∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). (10c)
Theorem 4 (Perfect matching containment in q-composite
random key graphs). For a q-composite random key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) with even n, if there is a sequence ξn with
limn→∞ ξn ∈ [−∞,∞] such that
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ ξn
n
, (11)
5then it holds under (7) that
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) contains a perfect matching. ]
= e−e
− limn→∞ ξn
(12)
=

0, if limn→∞ ξn = −∞, (13a)
1, if limn→∞ ξn =∞, (13b)
e−e
−ξ∗
, if limn→∞ ξn = ξ∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). (13c)
We establish Theorems 1–4 in Section VI. From Theorems
1–4, k-robustness (resp., Hamilton cycle containment, and
perfect matching containment) in Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has similar
asymptotic behavior as k-connectivity (resp., 2-connectivity
and 1-connectivity (i.e., connectivity)).
B. Design guidelines for secure sensor networks
Based on Theorems 1–4, we provide design guidelines
of a secure sensor network employing the q-composite key
predistribution scheme [6] and modeled by a q-composite
random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn). We identify the critical
value of each parameter given other parameters such that the
network has the desired property with probability at least p.
Taking k-connectivity as an example, we set e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)!
in (2) to be at least p to get limn→∞ αn ≥ − ln[(k− 1)! ln 1p ].
To use asymptotic results for large network design, we just
consider αn ≥ − ln[(k − 1)! ln 1p ], and obtain from (1) that
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ lnn+(k−1) ln lnn−ln[(k−1)! ln
1
p
]
n . (14)
However, (14) may not hold since all parameters are integers.
Since 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
on the left-hand side of (14) increases as
the key ring size Kn increases or as the key pool size
Pn decreases, and the term on the right-hand side of (14)
decreases as the number n of nodes increases for large n,
we define the critical key ring size (resp., the critical key
pool size, the critical number of nodes) as the minimal Kn
(resp., the maximal Pn, the minimal n) such that (14) holds.
Hence, for k-connectivity, the critical key ring size equals⌈√
Pn · 2q
√
q!·{lnn+(k−1) ln lnn−ln[(k−1)! ln 1
p
]}
n
⌉
, the critical key
pool size equals
⌊
Kn
2 · q
√
n
q!·{lnn+(k−1) ln lnn−ln[(k−1)! ln 1
p
]}
⌋
,
while the critical number of nodes can be solved numerically.
We provide some concrete numbers for better understanding
of the above guidelines. Typically, we choose q to be no greater
than 3 since larger q means more difficulty for two sensors
to satisfy the requirement of key sharing for establishing a
secure link. Below we discuss the choices of Pn and Kn for
different q and n. Again, we focus on k-connectivity since the
discussions of other properties are similar. Roughly speaking,
for small q (e.g., q = 1, 2, 3) and n being thousands, we can
choose Kn to be dozens and Pn to be tens of thousands to
have a k-connected network for small k (e.g., k = 1, 2, 3)
with a relatively high probability p (e.g., p = 0.95). We
can also let Kn to be hundreds and Pn to be hundreds of
thousands. As concrete examples, for q = 2 and n = 1000,
we can choose Kn = 88 and Pn = 50000 to have the
network 2-connected with probability 0.99 or 3-connected
with probability 0.95, and choose Kn = 92 and Pn = 50000
to have the network 3-connected with probability 0.99. For
q = 3, Kn = 300 and Pn = 250000, we can choose n = 1700
to have the network 2-connected with probability 0.99 or 3-
connected with probability 0.95, and choose n = 1500 to have
the network 1-connected with probability 0.99 or 2-connected
with probability 0.95.
Comparing (5) (8) (11) with (1), we know that the critical pa-
rameters for k-robustness (resp., Hamilton cycle containment
and perfect matching containment) are the same as those for k-
connectivity (resp., 2-connectivity and 1-connectivity). Hence,
we can easily use the guidelines for k-connectivity to obtain
the corresponding guidelines for k-robustness (resp., Hamilton
cycle containment and perfect matching containment).
C. Experimental results
We present experiments below to confirm our theoretical
results in Theorems 1–4. For Gq(n,Kn, Pn), we plot its prob-
abilities in terms of k-connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton
cycle containment and perfect matching containment in Figure
2 for q = 2, and in Figure 3 for q = 3,
• when the key ring size K varies in Figures 2(a) and 3(a),
• when the key pool size P varies in Figures 2(b) and 3(b),
• when the number n of nodes varies in Figures 2(c) and 3(c).
For each data point, we generate 500 independent samples of
Gq(n,Kn, Pn), record the count that the obtained graph has
the studied property, and then divide the count by 500 to obtain
the corresponding empirical probability. In each figure, we see
the transitional behavior. Also, we observe that the probability
• increases with K (resp., n) while fixing other parameters,
• decreases with P while fixing other parameters.
Moreover, in each figure, each vertical line presents the
critical parameter computed based on Section III-B above with
probability p being 0.5: the critical key ring size in Figures
2(a) and 3(a), the critical key pool size in Figures 2(b) and
3(b), and the critical number nodes in Figures 2(c) and 3(c).
Summarizing the above, the experiments have confirmed our
Theorems 1–4.
IV. USING THE TRANSITION WIDTH TO QUANTIFY THE
TRANSITIONAL BEHAVIOR IN SECTION III
In the previous section, we have presented the sharp transi-
tions in q-composite random key graphs in terms of the studied
graph properties. To further quantify the sharpness, we aim
to understand how should Kn grow to raise the probability
of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) having property I from ǫ to 1 − ǫ for a
positive constant ǫ < 12 , where I denotes one of k-connectivity,
Hamilton cycle containment, or perfect matching containment.
To this end, noting that there may not exist Kn such that
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has property I with probability exactly ǫ or
1 − ǫ since Kn is an integer, we quantify Kn that renders
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) having property I with probability at least ǫ
or 1− ǫ. To this end, we formally define for ǫ < 12 that
K−q,n(I, ǫ) := min
{
Kn
∣∣∣∣ Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has property Iwith probability at least ǫ.
}
(15)
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Fig. 2. For Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under q = 2, we plot its probabilities in terms of k-connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton cycle containment and perfect matching
containment. In each subfigure, each vertical line presents the critical parameter computed based on Section III-B.
    





key ring size K
1-connectivity
1-robustness
perfect matching
2-connectivity
2-robustness
Hamilton cycle
3-connectivity
3-robustness
n = 1000
P = 250000
q = 3
(a)
       
[






key pool size P
1-connectivity
1-robustness
perfect matching
2-connectivity
2-robustness
Hamilton cycle
3-connectivity
3-robustness
n = 1000
K = 300
q = 3
(b)
        





n (number of nodes)
1-connectivity
1-robustness
perfect matching
2-connectivity
2-robustness
Hamilton cycle
3-connectivity
3-robustness
K = 300
P = 250000
q = 3
(c)
Fig. 3. For Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under q = 3, we plot its probabilities in terms of k-connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton cycle containment and perfect matching
containment. In each subfigure, each vertical line presents the critical parameter computed based on Section III-B.
and
K+q,n(I, ǫ) := min
{
Kn
∣∣∣∣ Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has property Iwith probability at least 1− ǫ.
}
.
(16)
Then the transition width dq,n(I, ǫ) of graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
for property I and ǫ < 12 is defined by
dq,n(I, ǫ) = K+q,n(I, ǫ)−K−q,n(I, ǫ). (17)
A. Transition widths for k-connectivity, perfect matching con-
tainment and Hamilton cycle containment
Theorem 5 later in this section presents the result of the
transition width dq,n(I, ǫ) for a q-composite random key
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn). For Gq(n,Kn, Pn) modeling a secure
sensor network employing the q-composite key predistribution
scheme [6] in practice (so that Pn = Ω(n) from [19, Equation
(2)]), we have:
① for q = 1, the transition width dq,n(I, ǫ) can be very
small (even 0 or 1 as detailed below) for I being k-
connectivity,
② for q ≥ 2, dq,n(I, ǫ) scales with n and can be written as
ω(1) (i.e., it converges to ∞ as n→∞).
Roughly speaking, the transitional behavior for q = 1 can be
much sharper than that for q ≥ 2. We now discuss the implica-
tion to secure sensor network applications of Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Recall from Section I that the q-composite key predistribu-
tion scheme [6] in the special case of q = 1 becomes the
Eschenauer–Gligor (EG) key predistribution scheme [7]. Then
the result above shows a fundamental difference between the
EG scheme and the q-composite scheme (with q ≥ 2) in
terms of the transition width. We can interpret the difference
as a result that the EG scheme is more fragile than the
q-composite scheme in terms of preserving k-connectivity
under key revocation, where key revocation means remov-
ing keys that have been compromised [25]. In addition to
cryptographic exposure, another significant reason for keys
being compromised is a sensor-capture attack resulting in
that all secret keys of a captured node are discovered by
the adversary. Sensors deployed in hostile environments are
particularly prone to capture because their protection is limited
by low-cost considerations (in fact their operation is often
unattended) [6], [7], [25]. For a k-connected secure sensor
network under the EG scheme, since dq,n(k-connectivity, ǫ)
may be 0 or 1 from result ① above, then even revoking a
single key may induce losing k-connectivity (this is confirmed
by experiments of Figure 4 explained in Section IV-B). In
contrast, such extreme phenomenon does not happen for a
secure sensor network under the q-composite scheme with
q ≥ 2. This fundamental difference between the EG scheme
and the q-composite scheme with q ≥ 2 can be useful for
the design of secure sensor networks; e.g., q ≥ 2 is preferred
over q = 1 if one desires stronger resilience of k-connectivity
against key revocation.
Theorem 5. For a q-composite random key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn), we have:
• For q = 1, we have results (i.1) (i.2a) and (i.2b) below:
(i.1) d1,n(k-connectivity, ǫ) =
0 or 1 for each n sufficiently large,
if Pn = Ω(n) and Pn = o(n lnn), (18a)
Θ(1), if Pn = Θ(n lnn), (18b)
ω(1), if Pn = ω(n lnn); (18c)
(i.2a) d1,n(Hamilton cycle containment, ǫ) and
d1,n(perfect matching containment, ǫ) can both be written
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Fig. 4. For G1(n,Kn, Pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under q = 1), we plot
its k-connectivity probabilities for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The subfigure (a)
(resp., (b)) considers n = 1000 (resp., n = 10000). In each curve here,
d1,n(k-connectivity, ǫ) is just 0 or 1.
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Fig. 5. For G1(n,Kn, Pn), we plot its k-connectivity probabilities for
k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The subfigure (a) (resp., (b)) considers n = 1000 (resp.,
n = 10000). Comparing Figures 4(a) and 5(a) (or comparing Figures 4(b) and
5(b)), we see that when Pn increases, d1,n(k-connectivity, ǫ) can increase
from being just 0 or 1 to being greater than 1.
as ω(1), if Pn = ω
(
n(lnn)5
)
. (i.2b) Moreover, if we
improve Theorem 3 (resp., Theorem 4) by weakening the
condition of Pn for q = 1 from Pn = ω
(
n(lnn)5
)
to
Pn = Ω(n), then d1,n(Hamilton cycle containment, ǫ) (resp.,
d1,n(perfect matching containment, ǫ)) also satisfies (18a)
(18b) (18c) above.
• For q ≥ 2, we have the following results (ii.a) and (ii.b):
(ii.a) dq,n(k-connectivity, ǫ), dq,n(Hamilton cycle containment, ǫ),
and dq,n(perfect matching containment, ǫ) can all be written
as ω(1), if Pn = ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
. (ii.b) Furthermore, if
we improve Theorem 3 (resp., Theorem 4) by weakening the
condition of Pn for q ≥ 2 from Pn = ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
to Pn = Ω(n), then dq,n(Hamilton cycle containment, ǫ)
(resp., dq,n(perfect matching containment, ǫ)) is still ω(1) if
Pn = Ω(n).
We establish Theorem 5 in the Appendix.
B. Experimental results
We present experiments to confirm different behavior of
dq,n(k-connectivity, ǫ) for q = 1 and q ≥ 2, as explained
above. Figures 4 and 5 here consider q = 1, while the case of
q ≥ 2 has already been addressed by Figures 2 and 3.
In Figures 4 and 5 for q = 1, we plot the probabilities
of G1(n,Kn, Pn) being k-connected for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
For each data point, we generate 500 independent samples
of G1(n,Kn, Pn), record the count that the obtained graph
is k-connected, and then divide the count by 500 to obtain
the corresponding empirical probability. Comparing Figures
4(a) and 5(a) for n = 1000 (or comparing Figures 4(b)
and 5(b) for n = 10000), we see that when Pn increases,
d1,n(k-connectivity, ǫ) can increase from being just 0 or 1 to
being greater than 1.
Compared with Figures 4(a) and 4(b) for q = 1, Figures 2(a)
and 3(a) for q ≥ 2 present much larger dq,n(k-connectivity, ǫ).
To summarize, the experiments are useful to illustrate dif-
ferent behavior of dq,n(k-connectivity, ǫ) for q = 1 and q ≥ 2.
V. COMPARING THIS PAPER WITH RELATED WORK
We first elaborate the improvements of this paper over our
recent work [26]:
i) This paper considersGq(n,Kn, Pn) for general q (which
makes the analysis challenging), while [26] addresses
G1(n,Kn, Pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn) in the case of q = 1).
ii) This paper studies four properties: k-connectivity, k-
robustness, Hamilton cycle containment, and perfect
matching containment for general q and discusses their
applications to networked control, while [26] tackles only
the first two properties for q = 1.
iii) This paper further examines the transition widths of
various properties, and demonstrates different behavior
for q = 1 and q ≥ 2 (which provides a useful guideline
for resilient design of secure sensor networks as discussed
in Section IV-A), while [26] does not study the transition
widths.
Now we discuss the improvements of this paper over other
related work in terms of different graph properties respectively.
(k-)Connectivity. For connectivity (i.e., k-connectivity in
the case of k = 1) in G1(n,Kn, Pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
in the case of q = 1), Blackburn and Gerke [27], and
Yag˘an and Makowski [4] obtain different granularities of
zero–one laws; Rybarczyk [28] establishes the asymptotically
exact probability result; and earlier studies by Di Pitero
et al. [29] report results weaker than the above work [4],
[27], [28]. For k-connectivity in G1(n,Kn, Pn), Rybarczyk
[23] implicitly shows a zero–one law, and we [26] derive
the asymptotically exact probability. For Gq(n,Kn, Pn) with
constant q, Bloznelis and Łuczak [16] (resp., Bloznelis and
Rybarczyk [30]) have recently derived the asymptotically exact
probability for k-connectivity (resp., connectivity), but both
results after a rewriting address only the narrow range of Pn
satisfying both o
(
n
1
q (lnn)
2
5− 1q
)
and Ω
(
n
1
q (lnn)−
1
q
)
. Then
their range Pn = o
(
n
1
q (lnn)
2
5− 1q
)
= o(n) is impractical
in secure sensor networks modeled by Gq(n,Kn, Pn) where
Pn = Ω(n) holds from [19, Equation (2)]. In contrast, our
Theorem 1 investigates a more practical range of Pn given by
(4): Pn = Ω(n) for q = 1, and Pn = ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
for
q ≥ 2.
(k-)Robustness. Zhang and Sundaram [15] present a zero–
one law for k-robustness in an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph [13], where
each node pair has an edge independently with the same
probability. For G1(n,Kn, Pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn) in the
case of q = 1), we [26] analyze its k-robustness, while this
paper considers Gq(n,Kn, Pn) for general q.
Hamilton cycle containment. In terms of Hamilton cycle
containment in G1(n,Kn, Pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn) in the case
of q = 1), Nikoletseas et al. [17] prove that Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
under Kn ≥ 2 has a Hamilton cycle with a probability
8converging to 1 as n→∞, if it holds for some constant δ > 0
that n ≥ (1+δ)(PnKn) ln (PnKn), which implies a condition of Pn
not applicable to practical secure sensor networks modeled by
Gq(n,Kn, Pn); specifically, the condition implied by [17] is
that Pn is much smaller than n (Pn = O(
√
n ) given Kn ≥ 2,
Pn = O( 3
√
n ) if Kn ≥ 3, Pn = O( 4
√
n ) if Kn ≥ 4, etc.).
From [19, Equation (2)], Pn = Ω(n) holds in practical sensor
network applications. Different from the result of [17], our
Theorem 3 (i) applies to general q rather than only the special
case of q = 1, (ii) presents the asymptotically exact probability
which is stronger than the zero–one law (and thus further
stronger than the one-law of [17]), and (iii) considers a more
practical range of Pn given by (7): Pn = ω
(
n(lnn)5
)
for
q = 1, and Pn = ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
for q ≥ 2.
Perfect matching containment. For perfect matching con-
tainment in G1(n,Kn, Pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under q = 1),
Blackburn et al. [10] present a zero–one law, but their scaling
is in the form of c lnnn for c < 1 or c > 1, while our much
stronger scaling is lnn+ξnn for ξn → −∞ or ∞ as n → ∞
since the case of c = 1 not covered by [10] is addressed by us.
Moreover, our result is for general q while [10] is for q = 1
only. For perfect matching containment in Gq(n,Kn, Pn),
Bloznelis and Łuczak [16] give the asymptotically exact
probability result, but they tackle only the narrow range of Pn
satisfying both o
(
n
1
q (lnn)
2
5− 1q
)
and Ω
(
n
1
q (lnn)−
1
q
)
. Hence,
their range is also impractical in secure sensor networks
modeled by Gq(n,Kn, Pn) where Pn = Ω(n) holds from
[19, Equation (2)]. In contrast, our Theorem 4 investigates a
more practical range (7) where Pn = Ω(n) is implied.
VI. ESTABLISHING THEOREMS 1–4
To establish Theorems 1–4, we first explain the basic ideas
in Section VI-A and then provide additional proof details.
A. Basic ideas for proving Theorems 1–4
The basic ideas to show Theorems 1–4 are as follows. We
decompose the theorem results into lower and upper bounds,
where the lower bounds are proved by associating our studied
q-composite random key graph with an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph,
while the upper bounds are obtained by associating the studied
graph property in each theorem with minimum node degree.
1) Decomposing the results into lower and upper bounds:
We discuss the decomposition for Theorems 1–4, respectively.
➊ For Theorem 1, we prove (2) by showing that the prob-
ability P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-connected. ] has a lower
bound e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! × [1 − o(1)] and an upper bound
e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! × [1+ o(1)] (afterwards, the obtained (2)
implies (3a) (3b) (3c)).
➋ For Theorem 2, we prove (6b) (resp., (6a)) by showing
that the probability P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-robust. ] has a
lower bound 1 − o(1) (resp., an upper bound o(1)) for
limn→∞ βn =∞ (resp., limn→∞ βn = −∞). Given the
above, (6b) and (6a) immediately follow.
➌ For Theorem 3, we prove (9) by showing that the probabil-
ity P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a Hamilton cycle. ] has a lower
bound e−e
− limn→∞ γn × [1 − o(1)] and an upper bound
e−e
− limn→∞ γn × [1 + o(1)] (afterwards, the obtained (9)
implies (10a) (10b) (10c)).
➍ For Theorem 4, we prove (12) by showing that the prob-
ability P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a perfect matching. ] has a
lower bound e−e
− limn→∞ ξn × [1 − o(1)] and an upper
bound e−e
− limn→∞ ξn×[1+o(1)] (afterwards, the obtained
(12) implies (13a) (13b) (13c)).
2) Proving the lower bounds by showing that a q-composite
random key graph contains an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph: To prove
the above lower bounds of Section VI-A1 for our studied q-
composite random key graph, we will show that the studied
graph contains an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph as its spanning subgraph
with probability 1 − o(1), and show that the lower bounds
also hold for the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph. More specifically, the
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph under the corresponding conditions is k-
connected with probability e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! × [1− o(1)], is k-
robust with probability 1 − o(1), has a Hamilton cycle with
probability e−e
− limn→∞ γn × [1 − o(1)], and has a perfect
matching with probability e−e
− limn→∞ ξn × [1 − o(1)] (note
that the conditions for the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph are different for
different properties since they are derived from (1) (5) (8) (11)
respectively).
We provide more details for the above idea in Section VI-B.
3) Proving the upper bounds by considering minimum node
degree: To prove the upper bounds of Section VI-A1 for the
studied graph properties, we leverage the necessary conditions
on the minimum (node) degree enforced by the studied prop-
erties, and explain that the upper bounds also hold for the
requirements of the minimum degree. Specifically, we use the
following results:
① A necessary condition for a graph to be k-connected is
that the minimum degree is at least k [13].
② A necessary condition for a graph to be k-robust is k-
connectivity, which further requires that the minimum
degree is at least k [15].
③ A necessary condition for a graph to contain a Hamilton
cycle is that the minimum degree is at least 2 [31].
④ A necessary condition for a graph to contain a perfect
matching is that the minimum degree is at least 1 [32].
We provide more details in Appendix B.
In addition to the proof ideas above, we also find it useful
to confine the deviations αn, βn, γn, ξn in Theorems 1–4.
4) Confining αn, βn, γn, ξn in Theorems 1–4: We will
show that to prove Theorems 1–4, the deviations αn, βn,
γn, and ξn in the theorem statements can all be confined as
±o(lnn). More specifically, if Theorem 1 (resp., 2, 3, 4) holds
under the extra condition |αn| = o(lnn) (resp., |βn| = o(lnn),
|γn| = o(lnn), |ξn| = o(lnn)), then the result also holds
regardless of the extra condition. These extra conditions will
be useful for the aforementioned steps in Sections VI-A2 and
VI-A3. We present more details in Appendix C.
B. More details for proving the lower bounds of Section VI-A1
The idea has been explained in Section VI-A2. Lemma 1
relates an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, sn) with a q-composite
9random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), where GER(n, sn) is de-
fined on n nodes such that each node pair has an edge
independently with probability sn.
Lemma 1. If Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, KnPn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
and Kn =
ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, then there exists a sequence sn satisfying
sn =
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o ( 1lnn)] (19)
such that a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is
a spanning supergraph of an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, sn)
with probability 1− o(1).
Remark 1. From [23], (19) further implies that with for any
monotone increasing graph property I,
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has I. ] ≥ P[GER(n, sn) has I. ]− o(1).
(20)
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix E.
We evaluate sn given by (19) under different theorems. First,
as explained in Section VI-A4, to prove Theorem 1 (resp., 2,
3, 4), we can introduce the extra condition |αn| = o(lnn)
(resp., |βn| = o(lnn), |γn| = o(lnn), |ξn| = o(lnn)). Then
we obtain:
i) Under the condition (1) of Theorem 1 with the extra
condition |αn| = o(lnn), sn given by (19) satisfies
sn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn−o(1)
n . (21)
ii) Under the condition (5) of Theorem 2 with the extra
condition |βn| = o(lnn), sn given by (19) satisfies
sn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+βn−o(1)
n . (22)
iii) Under the condition (8) of Theorem 3 with the extra
condition |γn| = o(lnn), sn given by (19) satisfies
sn =
lnn+ln lnn+γn−o(1)
n . (23)
iv) Under the condition (11) of Theorem 4 with the extra
condition |ξn| = o(lnn), sn given by (19) satisfies
sn =
lnn+ξn−o(1)
n . (24)
Furthermore, we can show that all conditions of Lemma 1
hold (For Theorem 1, we replace (4) by (7) and address the
additional part using [5, Theorem 1]). Then we apply Lemma
1 to obtain (20), which we now use to establish the lower
bounds given in Section VI-A1.
Lower bound of k-connectivity. For sn satisfying (21), we
obtain from [13, Theorem 1] that probability of GER(n, sn)
being k-connected can be written as e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! ×
[1 ± o(1)]. This result and (20) (with I therein set as k-
connectivity) induce that Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under the conditions
of Theorem 1 with |αn| = o(lnn) is k-connected with
probability at least e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! × [1 − o(1)]. This proves
the lower bound in Bullet ➊ of Section VI-A1.
Lower bound of k-robustness. For sn satisfying (22), we
obtain from [26, Lemma 3] that probability of GER(n, sn)
being k-robust converges to 1 as n → ∞ and hence can be
written as 1− o(1). This result and (20) (with I therein set as
k-robustness) induce that Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under the conditions
of Theorem 2 with |βn| = o(lnn) is k-robust with probability
at least 1− o(1). This proves the lower bound in Bullet ➋ of
Section VI-A1.
Lower bound of Hamilton cycle containment. For sn sat-
isfying (23), we obtain from [31, Theorem 1] that probability
of GER(n, sn) having a Hamilton cycle can be written as
ee
− limn→∞ γn × [1±o(1)]. This result and (20) (with I therein
set as Hamilton cycle containment) induce that Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
under the conditions of Theorem 3 with |γn| = o(lnn) has a
Hamilton cycle with probability at least ee
− limn→∞ γn × [1−
o(1)]. This proves the lower bound in Bullet ➌ of Section
VI-A1.
Lower bound of perfect matching containment. For
sn satisfying (24), we obtain from [32, Theorem 1] that
probability of GER(n, sn) having a perfect matching can be
written as ee
− limn→∞ ξn × [1 ± o(1)]. This result and (20)
(with I therein set as perfect matching containment) induce
that Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under the conditions of Theorem 4 with
|ξn| = o(lnn) has a perfect matching with probability at least
ee
− limn→∞ ξn × [1 − o(1)]. This proves the lower bound in
Bullet ➍ of Section VI-A1.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 5
We recall from (15) (resp., (16)) that K−q,n(I, ǫ) (resp.,
K+q,n(I, ǫ)) denotes the minimal Kn such that Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
has property I with probability at least ǫ (resp., 1 − ǫ).
We prove Theorem 5 by analyzing dq,n(I, ǫ) defined as
K+q,n(I, ǫ) − K−q,n(I, ǫ) from (17). To do so, we will bound
K−q,n(I, ǫ) and K+q,n(I, ǫ) using Theorems 1, 3 and 4, where
I is k-connectivity, Hamilton cycle containment, or perfect
matching containment.
We define κ(I) by
κ(I) =

k, if I is k-connectivity,
2, if I is Hamilton cycle containment,
1, if I is perfect matching containment,
(25)
and define Fn(I) by
Fn(I) = lnn+ [κ(I)− 1] ln lnn. (26)
Recalling K−q,n(I, ǫ) in (15), we define ξ−q,n(I, ǫ) to ensure
1
q! ·
[K−q,n(I,ǫ)]2q
Pnq
=
Fn(I)+ξ−q,n(I,ǫ)
n , (27)
and now use
P[Gq(n,K
−
q,n(I, ǫ), Pn) has property I. ] ≥ ǫ (28)
to prove for any positive constant δ1 < ǫ that
K−q,n(I, ǫ) ≥
√
Pn × 2q
√
q![Fn(I)− ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ1)]/n
for all n sufficiently large, (29)
where (28) holds from the definition of K−q,n(I, ǫ) in (15).
Given (27), we will obtain (29) once proving (30) below:
ξ−q,n(I, ǫ) ≥ − ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ1) for all n sufficiently large.
(30)
By contradiction, if (30) is not true, there exists a subsequence
Ni|i=1,2,... of N (N denotes the set of all positive integers)
such that ξ−Ni(I, ǫ) < − ln(−[κ(I)−1]! ln δ1) for i = 1, 2, . . ..
By [33, Lemma 1], there exists a subsequence Mj|j=1,2,...
of Ni|i=1,2,... such that limj→∞ ξ−Mj (I, ǫ) ∈ [−∞,∞]. From
ξNi < − ln(−[κ(I) − 1]! ln δ1) for i = 1, 2, . . ., we have
lim
j→∞
ξ−Mj (I, ǫ) ∈ [−∞,− ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ1)]. (31)
Given (46) (26) and (27), we use Theorems 1–4 and the
subsequence principle to obtain
lim
j→∞
P[Gq(Mj,K
−
q,n(I, ǫ), Pn) has property I. ]
= e−
[
e
− limj→∞ ξ
−
Mj
(I,ǫ)]
/[κ(I)−1]!
≤ e−[eln(−[κ(I)−1]! ln δ1)]/[κ(I)−1]! = δ1, (32)
where the inequality uses (31). Since (32) contradicts (28)
given δ1 < ǫ, we have proved (30). Then (27) and (30) imply
(29).
Similar to the analysis of using (28) to prove (29), we use
P[Gq(n,K
−
q,n(I)− 1, ǫ), Pn) has property I. ] < ǫ (33)
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to prove for any positive constant δ2 > ǫ that
K−q,n(I, ǫ)≤
√
Pn× 2q
√
q![Fn(I)−ln(−[κ(I) − 1]! ln δ2)]/n+1
for all n sufficiently large, (34)
use
P[Gq(n,K
+
q,n(I, ǫ), Pn) has property I. ] ≥ 1− ǫ (35)
to prove for any positive constant δ3 < 1− ǫ that
K+q,n(I, ǫ) ≥
√
Pn × 2q
√
q![Fn(I)− ln(−[κ(I) − 1]! ln δ3)]/n
for all n sufficiently large, (36)
and use
P[Gq(n,K
+
q,n(I)− 1, ǫ), Pn) has property I. ] < 1− ǫ (37)
to prove for any positive constant δ4 > 1− ǫ that
K+q,n(I, ǫ)≤
√
Pn× 2q
√
q![Fn(I)−ln(−[κ(I) − 1]! ln δ4)]/n+1
for all n sufficiently large, (38)
With the transition width dq,n(I, ǫ) defined in (17), we
obtain from (29) (34) (36) and (38) that
dq,n(I, ǫ) + 1
≥
√
Pn
2q
√
q!/n×
[
2q
√
Fn(I)− ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ3)
− 2q
√
Fn(I)− ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ2)
]
(39)
and
dq,n(I, ǫ)− 1
≤
√
Pn
2q
√
q!/n×
[
2q
√
Fn(I)− ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ4)
− 2q
√
Fn(I)− ln(−[κ(I)− 1]! ln δ1)
]
.
(40)
It is straightforward to show that the right-hand side (RHS) of
(39) and the RHS of (40) can both be written as
Pn
1
2n−
1
2q (lnn)
1−2q
2q × (c1−c2)· 2q
√
q!
2q [1± o(1)]; (41)
in other words, from (39) and (40), we can write
RHS of (41)− 1 with c1 and c2 in case ① above ≤ dq,n(I, ǫ)
≤ RHS of (41)+ 1 with c1 and c2 in case ② above. (42)
After analyzing RHS of (41) for different Pn, we finally use
(42) to establish Theorem 5.
B. More details for proving the upper bounds of Sections
VI-A1 and VI-A3
The idea has been explained in Section VI-A3.
Lemma 2 below gives the asymptotically exact probability
for the property of minimum degree being at least k in a q-
composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Lemma 2 (Minimum degree in q-composite random key
graphs). For a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn),
if there is a sequence φn with limn→∞ φn ∈ [−∞,∞] such
that
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
= lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+φnn , (43)
then it holds under (7) that
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least k. ]
= e−
e− limn→∞ φn
(k−1)! (44)
=

0, if limn→∞ φn = −∞, (45a)
1, if limn→∞ φn =∞, (45b)
e−
e−φ
∗
(k−1)! , if limn→∞ φn = φ∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). (45c)
We defer the proof of Lemma 2 to Appendix F. With κ(I)
defined by
κ(I) =

k, if I is k-connectivity or k-robustness,
2, if I is Hamilton cycle containment,
1, if I is perfect matching containment,
(46)
from results ①–④ in Section VI-A3, we have
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has I. ]
≤ P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least κ(I). ]
(47)
More specifically, we can write (47) as the following (48)–
(51):
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-connected. ]
≤ P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least k. ],
(48)
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is k-robust. ]
≤ P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least k. ],
(49)
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a Hamilton cycle. ]
≤ P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least 2. ],
(50)
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a perfect matching. ]
≤ P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least 1. ],
(51)
Then clearly (48)–(51) and Lemma 2 together prove the upper
bounds in Bullet ➊–➍ of Section VI-A1. More precisely, we
have:
• (48) along with (168) of Lemma 2 proves the upper bound
in Bullet ➊ of Section VI-A1.
• (49) along with (169a) of Lemma 2 proves the upper
bound in Bullet ➋ of Section VI-A1.
• (50) along with (168) of Lemma 2 proves the upper bound
in Bullet ➌ of Section VI-A1.
• (51) along with (168) of Lemma 2 proves the upper bound
in Bullet ➍ of Section VI-A1.
C. Confining |αn|, |βn|, |γn|, |ξn| as o(lnn) in Theorems 1,
2, 3, 4
We will show that to prove Theorems 1–4, the deviations αn,
βn, γn, and ξn in the theorem statements can all be confined as
±o(lnn). More specifically, if Theorem 1 (resp., 2, 3, 4) holds
under the extra condition |αn| = o(lnn) (resp., |βn| = o(lnn),
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|γn| = o(lnn), |ξn| = o(lnn)), then the result also holds
regardless of the extra condition.
Notation for coupling between random graphs:
We will couple different random graphs together. The idea
is converting a problem of one random graph to the corre-
sponding problem in another random graph, in order to solve
the original problem. Formally, a coupling [12], [23], [34] of
two random graphs G1 and G2 means a probability space on
which random graphs G′1 and G
′
2 are defined such that G
′
1 and
G′2 have the same distributions as G1 and G2, respectively.
If G′1 is a spanning subgraph (resp., supergraph)
1 of G′2,
we say that under the coupling, G1 is a spanning subgraph
(resp., supergraph) of G2, which yields that for any monotone
increasing property I, the probability of G1 having I is at
most (resp., at least) the probability of G2 having I.
Following Rybarczyk’s notation [23], we write
G1 G2 (resp., G1 1−o(1) G2) (52)
if there exists a coupling under which G2 is a spanning
subgraph of G1 with probability 1 (resp., 1− o(1)).
Note that k-connectivity, k-robustness, Hamilton cycle con-
tainment, or perfect matching containment are all monotone
increasing2. For any monotone increasing property I, the
probability that a spanning subgraph (resp., supergraph) of
graph G has I is at most (resp., at least) the probability of G
having I. Therefore, to show
Theorem 1 under |αn| = o(lnn) (53)
=⇒ Theorem 1 regardless of |αn| = o(lnn),
Theorem 2 under |βn| = o(lnn) (54)
=⇒ Theorem 2 regardless of |βn| = o(lnn),
Theorem 3 under |γn| = o(lnn) (55)
=⇒ Theorem 3 regardless of |γn| = o(lnn),
Theorem 4 under |ξn| = o(lnn) (56)
=⇒ Theorem 4 regardless of |ξn| = o(lnn).
it suffices to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. (a) For graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under
Pn =
{
Ω(n), for q = 1,
ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
, for q ≥ 2. (57)
and
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ νn
n
(58)
with limn→∞ νn = −∞, there exists graph Gq(n, K˜n, P˜n)
under
P˜n =
{
Ω(n), for q = 1,
ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
, for q ≥ 2. (59)
1A graph Ga is a spanning subgraph (resp., spanning supergraph) of a
graph Gb if Ga and Gb have the same node set, and the edge set of Ga is
a subset (resp., superset) of the edge set of Gb.
2A graph property is called monotone increasing if it holds under the
addition of edges [14].
and
1
q!
· K˜n
2q
P˜n
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ ν˜n
n
(60)
with limn→∞ ν˜n = −∞ and ν˜n = −o(lnn), such that
there exists a graph coupling under which Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is
a spanning subgraph of Gq(n, K˜n, P˜n).
(b) For graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) under (59) and
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ νn
n
(61)
with limn→∞ νn = ∞, there exists graph Gq(n, K̂n, P̂n)
under
P̂n =
{
Ω(n), for q = 1,
ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
, for q ≥ 2. (62)
and
1
q!
· K̂n
2q
P̂n
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ ν̂n
n
(63)
with limn→∞ ν̂n =∞ and ν̂n = o(lnn), such that there exists
a graph coupling under which Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is a spanning
supergraph of Gq(n, K̂n, P̂n).
D. Proof of Lemma 3
a) Proving property (a).: We define ν˜n
∗
by
ν˜n
∗ = max{νn,− ln lnn}, (64)
and define K˜n
∗
such that
1
q!
· (K˜n
∗
)2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ ν˜n∗
n
. (65)
We set
K˜n :=
⌊
K˜n
∗⌋
, (66)
and
P˜n := Pn. (67)
From (61) (64) and (65), it holds that
Kn ≤ K˜n
∗
. (68)
Then by (66) (68) and the fact that Kn and K˜n are both
integers, it follows that
Kn ≤ K˜n. (69)
From (67) and (69), by [35, Lemma 3], there exists a graph
coupling under which Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is a spanning subgraph
of Gq(n, K˜n, P˜n). Therefore, the proof of property (a) is
completed once we show ν˜n defined in (60) satisfies
lim
n→∞ ν˜n = −∞, (70)
ν˜n = −o(lnn). (71)
We first prove (70). From (60) (65) and (66), it holds that
ν˜n ≤ ν˜n∗, (72)
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which together with (64) and limn→∞ νn = −∞ yields (70).
Now we establish (71). From (66), we have K˜n > K˜n
∗−1.
Then from (60) and (67), it holds that
ν˜n = n · 1
q!
· K˜n
2q
Pn
q − [lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn]
> n · 1
q!
· (K˜n
∗ − 1)2q
Pn
q − [lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn]. (73)
By limn→∞ νn = −∞, it holds that νn ≤ 0 for all n
sufficiently large. Then from (64), it follows that
ν˜n
∗
= −o(lnn), (74)
which along with Lemma 4, equation (65) and condition Pn =
Ω(n) induces
K˜n
∗
= Ω
(
(lnn)
1
2q
)
. (75)
Hence, we have limn→∞ K˜n
∗
= ∞ and it further holds for
all n sufficient large that
(K˜n
∗ − 1)2q > (K˜n
∗
)2q − 3s(K˜n
∗
)2q−1. (76)
Applying (76) to (73) and then using (65), Lemma 4 and Pn =
Ω(n), it follows that
ν˜n > n · 1
q!
· (K˜n
∗
)2q − 3s(K˜n
∗
)2q−1
Pn
q − [lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn]
= ν˜n
∗ − 3s
q!
· n ·Θ(Pn− 12n− 2q−12q (lnn) 2q−12q )
= ν˜n
∗ −O(n− 12+ 12q (lnn)1− 12q ). (77)
We only need to consider q ≥ 2 here since the case of q = 1
is already proved by us as Lemma 5 of [26]. Using q ≥ 2 in
(77), it holds that ν˜n > ν˜n
∗
+o(1), which along with (72) and
(74) yields (71).
b) Proving property (b).: We define ν̂n
∗
by
ν̂n
∗
= min{νn, ln lnn}, (78)
and define K̂n
∗
such that
1
q!
· (K̂n
∗
)2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ ν̂n∗
n
. (79)
We set
K̂n :=
⌈
K̂n
∗⌉
, (80)
and
P̂n := Pn. (81)
From (61) (78) and (79), it holds that
Kn ≥ K̂n
∗
. (82)
Then by (80) (82) and the fact that Kn and K̂n are both
integers, it follows that
Kn ≥ K̂n. (83)
From (81) and (83), by [35, Lemma 3], there exists a graph
coupling under which Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is a spanning supergraph
of Gq(n, K̂n, P̂n). Therefore, the proof of property (b) is
completed once we show ν̂n defined in (63) satisfies
lim
n→∞
ν̂n =∞, (84)
ν̂n = o(lnn). (85)
We first prove (84). From (63) (79) and (80), it holds that
ν̂n ≥ ν̂n∗, (86)
which together with (78) and limn→∞ νn =∞ yields (84).
Now we establish (85). From (80), we have K̂n < K̂n
∗
+1.
Then from (63) and (81), it holds that
ν̂n = n · 1
q!
· K̂n
2q
Pn
q − [lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn]
< n · 1
q!
· (K̂n
∗
+ 1)
2q
Pn
q − [lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn]. (87)
By limn→∞ νn =∞, it holds that νn ≥ 0 for all n sufficiently
large. Then from (78), it follows that
ν̂n
∗
= o(lnn), (88)
which along with Lemma 4, equation (79) and condition Pn =
Ω(n) induces
K̂n
∗
= Ω
(
(lnn)
1
2q
)
. (89)
Hence, we have limn→∞ K̂n
∗
= ∞ and it further holds for
all n sufficient large that
(K̂n
∗
+ 1)
2q
< (K̂n
∗
)2q + 3s(K̂n
∗
)2q−1. (90)
Applying (90) to (87) and then using (79), Lemma 4 and Pn =
Ω(n), it follows that
ν̂n < n · 1
q!
· (K̂n
∗
)2q + 3s(K̂n
∗
)2q−1
Pn
q − [lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn]
= ν̂n
∗
+
3s
q!
· n ·Θ(Pn− 12n− 2q−12q (lnn) 2q−12q )
= ν̂n
∗
+ O
(
n−
1
2+
1
2q (lnn)1−
1
2q
)
. (91)
We only need to consider q ≥ 2 here since the case of q = 1
is already proved by us as Lemma 5 of [26]. Using q ≥ 2 in
(91), it holds that ν̂n < ν̂n
∗
+o(1), which along with (86) and
(88) yields (85).
Lemma 4. If 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
= lnn±o(lnn)n and Pn = Ω(n
c) for
constant c, then Kn = Ω
(
n
c
2− 12q (lnn)
1
2q
)
.
Proof of Lemma 4:
From condition
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn± o(lnn)
n
∼ lnn
n
, (92)
it holds that
Kn
2
Pn
= Θ
(
n−
1
q (lnn)
1
q
)
, (93)
which along with condition Pn = Ω(n
c) yields Kn =√
Pn ·Θ
(
n−
1
q (lnn)
1
q
)
= Ω
(
n
c
2− 12q (lnn)
1
2q
)
.
14
E. Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 (Restated). If Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, KnPn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
and Kn = ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, then there exists a sequence sn
satisfying
sn =
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o ( 1lnn)] (94)
such that a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is
a spanning supergraph of an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, sn)
with probability 1− o(1).
We have explained the notation for coupling between ran-
dom graphs in Appendix C. Then the conclusion in Lemma 1
means
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) 1−o(1) GER(n, sn).
Proof of Lemma 1:
To prove Lemma 1, we introduce an auxiliary graph called
a binomial q-intersection graph Hq(n, xn, Pn) [35], [36],
which can be defined on n nodes by the following process.
There exists a key pool of size Pn. Each key in the pool
is added to each node independently with probability xn.
After each node obtains a set of keys, two nodes establish
an edge in between if and only if they share at least q keys.
Clearly, the only difference between a binomial q-intersection
graph Hq(n, xn, Pn) and a q-composite random key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) for the q-composite key predistribution scheme
is that in the former, the number of keys assigned to each node
obeys a binomial distribution with Pn as the number of trials,
and with xn as the success probability in each trial, while in
the latter graph, such number equals Kn with probability 1.
In Appendix E1 below, we prove Lemma 1 by using
Lemmas 5 and 6 below.
Lemma 5. If Kn = ω(lnn) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o (1), with xn set by
xn =
Kn
Pn
(
1−
√
3 lnn
Kn
)
, (95)
then it holds that
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) 1−o(1) Hq(n, xn, Pn). (96)
We establish Lemma 5 in Appendix E2.
Lemma 6. If
xnPn = ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, (97)
xn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
, (98)
xn
2Pn = o
(
1
lnn
)
, and (99)
xn
2Pn = ω
( (lnn)6
n2
)
, (100)
then there exits some sn satisfying
sn =
(Pnxn
2)q
q! ·
[
1− o ( 1lnn) ] (101)
such that Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, sn) [37] obeys
Hq(n, xn, Pn) 1−o(1) GER(n, sn). (102)
We prove Lemma 6 in Appendix E3.
1) Proof of Lemma 1 Using Lemmas 5 and 6:
We complete the proof of Lemma 1 by using Lemmas 5
and 6. We first explain that given the conditions of Lemma 1:
Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, (103)
Kn
Pn
= o
(
1
n lnn
)
, (104)
Kn = ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, (105)
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
( (lnn)6
n2
)
, (106)
all conditions in Lemmas 5 and 6 are true; i.e.,
Kn = ω(lnn), (107)
Kn
2
Pn
= o (1), (108)
xn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
, (109)
xn
2Pn = o
(
1
lnn
)
, and (110)
xn
2Pn = ω
( (lnn)6
n2
)
, (111)
all hold, where xn is defined in (95).
Clearly, (105) implies (107). Also, (108) implies (103).
Using (105) in (95), it follows that
xn =
Kn
Pn
·
[
1− o
(√
3 lnn
(lnn)3
)]
(112)
= KnPn ·
[
1− o ( 1lnn)]. (113)
Then we obtain the following. First, (113) and (104) together
yield (109). Second, (113) and (103) induce (110). Third, (113)
and (106) lead to (111). Therefore, all conditions in Lemmas
5 and 6 hold.
We use sn defined in (101). By [12, Fact 3] on the
transitivity of graph coupling, we use (96) in Lemma 5 and
(102) in Lemma 6 to obtain
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) 1−o(1) GER(n, sn). (114)
From (112) and (101), we derive
sn =
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o ( 1lnn)]2q = 1q! · Kn2qPnq · [1− o ( 1lnn) ],
(115)
where the last step uses the fact that for a sequence an =
o
(
1
lnn
)
, we have (1− an)2q = 1− o
(
1
lnn
)
. To see this, given
an = o
(
1
lnn
)
and thus 0 ≤ an < 1 for all n sufficiently large,
we use [5, Fact 2] to obtain 1 − an · 2q ≤ (1 − an)2q ≤
1− an · 2q + 12 · an2 · (2q)2.
To summarize, the proof of Lemma 1 is completed.
2) Proof of Lemma 5:
By [35, Lemma 4], if xnPn = ω (lnn), and for all n
sufficiently large,
Kn ≥ xnPn +
√
3(xnPn + lnn) lnn, (116)
then
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) 1−o(1) Hq(n, xn, Pn). (117)
Therefore, the proof of Lemma 5 is completed once we
show xnPn = ω (lnn) and (116) with xn defined in (95).
From conditions Kn = ω (lnn) and xn =
Kn
Pn
(
1−
√
3 lnn
Kn
)
,
we first obtain xnPn = ω (lnn) and then for all n sufficiently
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large,
Kn −
[
xnPn +
√
3(xnPn + lnn) lnn
]
= Kn
√
3 lnn
Kn
−
√√√√3[Kn(1−√3 lnn
Kn
)
+ lnn
]
lnn
=
√
3Kn lnn−
√
3
[
Kn+
√
lnn
(√
lnn−
√
3Kn
)]
lnn
≥
√
3Kn lnn−
√
3Kn lnn
= 0, (118)
where we use Kn ≥ lnn for all n sufficiently large (this holds
from condition Kn = ω (lnn)). Then it is clear that Lemma
5 is proved.
3) Proving Lemma 6:
We number the keys in the key pool of size Pn by
1, 2, . . . , Pn. In binomial q-intersection graph Hq(n, Pn, xn),
let Ui be the set of sensors assigned with key κi (i =
1, 2, . . . , Pn). Then Ui denoting the cardinality of Ui (i.e.,
Ui := |Ui|) obeys a binomial distribution Bin(n, xn), with
n as the number of trials, and xn as the success probability
in each trial. Clearly, we can generate the random set Ui in
the following equivalent manner: First draw the cardinality Ui
from the distribution Bin(n, xn), and then choose Ui distinct
nodes uniformly at random from the set Vn of all n nodes
(Vn = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}).
Given Ui defined above, we generate a graph H(Ui) on
node set Vn as follows. We construct the graph H(Ui) by
establishing edges between any and only pair of nodes in
Ui; i.e., H(Ui) has a clique on Ui and no edges between
nodes outside of this clique. If a given realization of the
random variable Ui satisfies Ui < 2, then the corresponding
instantiation of H(Ui) will be an empty graph.
We now explain the connection between H(Ui) and the
binomial q-intersection graph Hq(n, Pn, xn). We let an op-
erator Oq take a multigraph [38] with possibly multiple edges
between two nodes as its argument. The operator returns a
simple graph with an undirected edge between two nodes i
and j, if and only if the input multigraph has at least q edges
between these nodes. Recall that two nodes in Hq(n, Pn, xn)
need to share at least q keys to have an edge in between.
Then, with H(U1), . . . , H(UPn) generated independently, it is
straightforward to see
Oq
(
Pn⋃
i=1
H(Ui)
)
=st Hq(n, Pn, xn), (119)
with =st denoting statistical equivalence.
We will introduce auxiliary random graphs L(n,B) and
Lq(n,B), both defined on the n-size node set Vn =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, where B is a random integer variable. The
motivation for defining L(n,B) and Lq(n,B) is that they
serve as an intermediate step to build the connection between
the above binomial q-intersection graph Hq(n, Pn, xn) and an
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph. More specifically,
• on the one hand, given Ui defined above, we build the
connection between L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
) and H(Ui), in order to
find the relationship between Lq
(
n,
∑Pn
i=1
⌊
Ui/2
⌋)
and
the binomial q-intersection graph Hq(n, Pn, xn);
• on the other hand, when Z is a Poisson random variable,
L(n, Z) becomes an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph;
• given the above two points, we further find the rela-
tionship between Lq
(
n,
∑Pn
i=1
⌊
Ui/2
⌋)
and L(n, Z) for
a Poisson random variable Z . Then summarizing all
points, we build the connection between the binomial
q-intersection graph Hq(n, Pn, xn) and an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
graph.
We now define L(n,B) and Lq(n,B) on the node set Vn =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} for a random integer variable B. For different
nodes vi and vj , we use edge(vi, vj) to denote an undirected
edge between nodes vi and vj so there is no difference
between edge(vi, vj) and edge(vj , vi). For the n nodes in
Vn = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, the number of possible edges is
(
n
2
)
(i.e., the number of ways to select two unordered nodes from n
nodes). Among these
(
n
2
)
edges, we select one edge uniformly
at random at each time. We repeat the selection b times
independently for an integer b. Note that at each time, an edge
is selected from the
(
n
2
)
edges, so we have that even if an edge
has already been selected, it may get selected again next time.
In other words, the selections are done with repetition since it
is possible that an edge gets selected multiple times. After the
b times of selection, we obtain b edges where several edges
may be the same. These b edges constitute a multiset M(b),
where a multiset is a generalization of a set such that unlike
a set, a multiset allows multiple elements to take the same
value. Given an integer b, after obtaining a multiset M(b)
according to the above procedure, we now construct graphs
L(n, b) and Lq(n, b), which are both defined on the node set
Vn = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. An edge is put in graph L(n, b) if and
only if it appears at least once in the multiset M(b), while
an edge is put in graph Lq(n, b) if and only if it appears at
least q times in the multiset M(b). Now given graphs L(n, b)
and Lq(n, b) for an integer b, we define graphs L(n,B) and
Lq(n,B) for an integer-valued random variable B as follows:
we let L(n,B) be L(n, b) with probability P[B = b], and let
Lq(n,B) be Lq(n, b) with probability P[B = b].
With H(Ui) and L(n,B) given above, we show a coupling
below under which random graph L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
) is a subgraph
of random graph H(Ui); i.e.,
H(Ui)  L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
). (120)
By definition, graph L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
) has at most
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
edges
and thus contains non-isolated nodes with a number (denoted
by ℓ) at most 2 · ⌊Ui/2⌋ ≤ Ui, where a node is non-isolated if
it has a link with at least another node, and a node is isolated
if it has no link with any other node. Given an instance L
of random graph L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
), we construct set Ui as the
union of the ℓ number non-isolated nodes in L and the rest
(Ui − ℓ) nodes selected uniformly at random from the rest
(n − ℓ) isolated nodes in L. Since graph H(Ui) contains a
clique of Ui, it is clear that the induced instance of H(Ui) is
a supergraph of the instance L of graph L(n, ⌊Ui/2⌋). Then
the proof of (120) is completed.
Now based on L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
), we construct a graph defined
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on node set Vn. We add an edge between two nodes in this
graph if and only if there exist at least q different number
of i such that the two nodes have an edge in each of these
L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
). By the independence of Ui (i = 1, 2, . . . , Pn)
and the definition of Lq(n,B) above, it is clear that such in-
duced graph is statistically equivalent to Lq
(
n,
∑Pn
i=1
⌊
Ui/2
⌋)
.
Namely, we have
Oq
(
Pn⋃
i=1
L(n,
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
)
)
=st Lq
(
n,
Pn∑
i=1
⌊
Ui/2
⌋)
(121)
In view of (119), (120), and (121), we see
Hq(n, Pn, xn)  Lq(n, Y ), (122)
where Y is defined via
Y :=
Pn∑
i=1
Wi, (123)
with
Wi :=
⌊
Ui/2
⌋
= 12 (Ui − I[Ui is odd]). (124)
We now explore a bound of Y based on (123) and (124). For
a random variableR, we denote its expected value (i.e., mean)
and variance by E[R] and Var[R], respectively. As noted, Ui
obeys a binomial distribution Bin(n, xn). Then
E[Ui] =
∑
a=0,1,...,n
[
a ·
(
n
a
)
xn
a(1− xn)n−a
]
= nxn
∑
a=0,1,...,n
[(
n− 1
a− 1
)
xn
a−1(1 − xn)n−a
]
= nxn[xn + (1− xn)]n−1
= nxn, (125)
and
E
[
I[Ui is odd]
]
= P[Ui is odd]
=
∑
a=1,3,...,n−I[Ui is even]
(
n
a
)
xn
a(1− xn)n−a
=
1
2
∑
a=0,1,...,n
(
n
a
)
xn
a(1− xn)n−a
− 1
2
∑
a=0,1,...,n
(
n
a
)
(−xn)a(1− xn)n−a
= 12 [xn + (1 − xn)]n − 12 [−xn + (1− xn)]n
= 12 [1− (1 − 2xn)n]. (126)
Applying (125) and (126) to (124), and using the condition
(98) (i.e., xn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
), we derive
E[Wi]
= 12E[Ui]− 12E
[
I[Ui is odd]
]
(127)
= 12nxn − 14 + 14 (1− 2xn)n
= 12nxn − 14 + 14
[
1− 2nxn + 2n(n− 1)xn2 ±O
(
n3xn
3
)]
= 12n(n− 1)xn2 ±O
(
n3xn
3
)
= 12n(n− 1)xn2 · [1± o(nxn)] (128)
From (124), it holds that
Var[2Wi]
= Var
[
Ui − I[Ui is odd]
]
= Var[Ui] + Var[I[Ui is odd]]− 2Cov[Ui, I[Ui is odd]], (129)
where Cov[Ui, I[Ui is odd]] denoting the covariance between Ui
and I[Ui is odd] is given by
Cov[Ui, I[Ui is odd]]
= E
[
(Ui − E[Ui])
(
I[Ui is odd] − E[I[Ui is odd]]
)]
= E[UiI[Ui is odd]]− E[Ui]E[I[Ui is odd]]. (130)
Clearly, it holds that UiI[Ui is odd] ≥ I[Ui is odd], inducing
E[UiI[Ui is odd]] ≥ E[I[Ui is odd]]. (131)
From (125) and (126), we further obtain
E[Ui]E[I[Ui is odd]]− 32 · (E[Ui]− E[I[Ui is odd]])
= nxn · 12 [1− (1− 2xn)n]− 32
{
nxn − 12 [1− (1− 2xn)n]
}
= −nxn + 34 − (12nxn + 34 )(1− 2xn)n
≤ −nxn + 34 − (12nxn + 34 )(1− 2nxn + 43n2xn2)
= − 23n2xn2 ≤ 0, (132)
where the step involving the first “≤” uses the inequality (1−
2xn)
n ≥ 1−2nxn+ 43n2xn2 for all n sufficiently large, which
is derived from a Taylor expansion of the binomial series (1−
2xn)
n, given the condition (98) (i.e., xn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
).
Using (131) and (132) in (130), it follows that
Cov[Ui, I[Ui is odd]] ≥ 52E[I[Ui is odd]]− 32E[Ui]. (133)
For binomial random variable Ui and Bernoulli random vari-
able I[Ui is odd], it is clear that
Var[Ui] ≤ E[Ui], (134)
and
Var[I[Ui is odd]] ≤ E[I[Ui is odd]]. (135)
Applying (133) (134) and (135) to (129), we have
Var[2Wi] ≤ E[Ui] + E[I[Ui is odd]]
− 5E[I[Ui is odd]] + 3E[Ui]
= 4(E[Ui]− E[I[Ui is odd]]), (136)
which along with (127) yields Var[2Wi] ≤ 8E[Wi]; i.e.,
Var[Wi] ≤ 2E[Wi]. (137)
Considering the independence of Wi (i = 1, 2, . . . , Pn), for
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Y =
∑Pn
i=1Wi given in (144), we use (137) to derive
Var[Y ] ≤ 2E[Y ]. (138)
From Y =
∑Pn
i=1Wi, (128), and the fact that E[Wi] for
each i is the same, we obtain
E[Y ] = 12n(n− 1)Pnxn2 · [1± o(nxn)]. (139)
Note that Lemma 6 has conditions (98) and (100) (i.e., xn =
o
(
1
n lnn
)
and xn
2Pn = ω
( (lnn)6
n2
)
). Using these in (139), we
have
E[Y ] = 12n(n− 1)Pnxn2 ·
[
1± o( 1lnn)] (140)
and
E[Y ] = ω
(
(lnn)6
)
. (141)
Now based on (138) and (141), we provide a lower bound on
Y with high probability. By Chebyshev’s inequality, it follows
that for any φ > 0,
P
[ |Y − E[Y ]| ≥ φ√Var[Y ]] ≤ φ−2. (142)
We select
φ =
{
E[Y ]
} 5
6
2
√
Var[Y ]
, (143)
which with (138) and (141) results in φ = ω(1) and hence
P
[
Y < E[Y ]− φ
√
Var[Y ]
]
= o(1). (144)
Let Z be a Poisson random variable with mean
λn := E[Y ]−
{
E[Y ]
} 5
6 . (145)
With ψn defined by
ψn :=
1
2
{
E[Y ]
} 1
3 , (146)
we conclude from (141) (145) and (146) that ψn = ω(1) and
ψn = o
(√
λn
)
.
By [38, Lemma 1.2], it holds that
P
[
Z ≥ λn + ψn
√
λn
] ≤ eψn√λn−(λn+ψn√λn) ln(1+ ψn√λn ).
(147)
From ψn = o
(√
λn
)
, then for all n sufficiently large, we have
ln
(
1+ ψn√
λn
) ≥ ψn√
λn
− ψn22λn (derived from a Taylor expansion),
which is used in (147) to yield
P
[
Z ≥ λn + ψn
√
λn
] ≤ eψn√λn−(λn+ψn√λn)( ψn√λn−ψn22λn )
= e
ψn
2
2
(
ψn√
λn
−1
)
. (148)
Applying ψn = ω(1) and ψn = o
(√
λn
)
to (148), we obtain
P
[
Z ≥ λn + ψn
√
λn
]
= o(1). (149)
From (143) (145) and (146), we establish
λn + ψn
√
λn ≤ E[Y ]−
{
E[Y ]
} 5
6 + 12
{
E[Y ]
} 1
3 ·
√
E[Y ]
= E[Y ]− φ
√
Var[Y ]. (150)
Given (144) (149) and (150), we obtain
P[Y ≥ Z]
≥ P
[(
Y ≥ E[Y ]− φ
√
Var[Y ]
)∩ (λn + ψn√λn ≥ Z )]
≥ 1− P[Y < E[Y ]− φ√Var[Y ]]− P[λn + ψn√λn < Z ]
→ 1, as n→∞, (151)
where in the second to the last step, we use a union bound.
Given (151), by the definition of graph Lq(n,X), it is easy
to construct a coupling such that Lq(n, Z) is a subgraph of
Lq(n, Y ) with probability 1− o(1); namely,
Lq(n, Y ) 1−o(1) Lq(n, Z). (152)
From [39, Proof of Claim 1], for Poisson random variable
Z with mean λn, in sampling Z edges with repetition from all
possible
(
n
2
)
edges of an n-size node set, the numbers of draws
for different edges are independent Poisson random variables
with mean
µn := λn
/(
n
2
)
, (153)
where “with repetition” means that at each time, an edge is
selected from the
(
n
2
)
edges, so we have that even if an edge
has already been selected, it may get selected again next time.
Therefore, Lq(n, Z) with Z ∈ Poisson(λn) is an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
graph [37] in which each edge independently appears with a
probability that a Poisson random variable with mean µn is at
least q, i.e., a probability of
̺n :=
∞∑
x=q
µn
xe−µn
x!
. (154)
In view that Lq(n, Z) is equivalent to GER(n, ̺n), then
from (122) and (152), it follows that
Hq(n, Pn, xn) 1−o(1) GER(n, ̺n), (155)
which is exactly (102) in Lemma 6. Therefore, to complete
proving Lemmas 6, we now analyze ̺n in (154).
From [40, Proposition 1], ̺n in (154) can be bounded by
µn
qe−µn
q!
< ̺n <
µn
qe−µn
q!
·
(
1− µn
q + 1
)−1
. (156)
To evaluate ̺n based on (156), we now assess µn in (153),
and analyze λn in (145). Applying (140) and (141) to (145),
and noting that
[
1±o( 1lnn)] ·[1±o( 1lnn)] can also be written
as
[
1± o( 1lnn)], we obtain
λn = E[Y ]−
{
E[Y ]
} 5
6
= E[Y ] ·
[
1− {E[Y ]}− 16 ]
= 12n(n− 1)Pnxn2 ·
[
1± o( 1lnn)]. (157)
The application of (157) to (153) gives
µn = Pnxn
2 · [1± o( 1lnn)]. (158)
Note that Lemma 6 has condition (99) (i.e., xn
2Pn = o
(
1
lnn
)
).
Using (99) in (158), we have
µn = o
(
1
lnn
)
. (159)
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For any sequence an satisfying an = ±o(1), we explain
below (1+an)
q = 1±Θ(an) since q is a constant. To see this,
given |an| < 1 for all n sufficiently large from an = ±o(1),
we obtain: on the one hand, (1 + an)
q ≤ (1 + |an|)q = 1 +∑q
i=1
[(
q
i
)|an|i] ≤ 1 + |an|∑qi=1 (qi) = 1 + (2q − 1)|an| =
1+Θ(an); on the other hand, (1− an)q ≤ (1 + |an|)q = 1+∑q
i=1
[(
q
i
)
(−|an|)i
] ≥ 1−|an|∑qi=1 (qi) = 1−(2q−1)|an| =
1−Θ(an). Summarizing 1−Θ(an) ≤ (1−an)q ≤ 1+Θ(an),
we obtain
(1 + an)
q = 1±Θ(an) for an = ±o(1). (160)
From (158) and (160), it holds that
µn
q = (Pnxn
2)q · [1± o( 1lnn)]. (161)
For µn = o(1), we explain below e
−µn = 1 − Θ(µn). To
see this, on the one hand, it holds that e−µn ≥ 1−µn. On the
other hand, given µn < 0.5 for all n sufficiently large (which
holds from µn = o(1)), we can easily show e
−µn ≤ 1−0.5µn
by taking the derivative of e−µn − (1− 0.5µn) to investigate
its monotonicity. Summarizing 1 − µn ≤ e−µn ≤ 1 − 0.5µn,
we obtain
e−µn = 1−Θ(µn). (162)
From µn = o(1), we have
(
1 − µnq+1
)−1
= 1 + µnq+1−µn =
1+Θ(µn), which along with (162) is used in (156) to derive
̺n=
µn
qe−µn
q!
·[1+Θ(µn)]= µnq
q!
·[1−Θ(µn)] ·[1+Θ(µn)].
(163)
For any two sequences cn and dn satisfying cn = Θ(µn) and
dn = Θ(µn) with µn = o(1), we have (1 − cn)(1 + dn) =
1 − cn + dn − cndn = 1 ± Θ(µn), which we use in (163) to
get
̺n =
µn
q
q!
· [1±Θ(µn)]. (164)
Then applying (161) and (159) to (164), and noting that
[
1±
o
(
1
lnn
)] · [1 ± o( 1lnn)] can also be written as [1 ± o( 1lnn)],
we obtain
̺n =
(Pnxn
2)q
q! ·
[
1± o( 1lnn)]. (165)
From [23, Fact 3], for Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs GER(n, s
′
n) and
GER(n, s
′′
n), if s
′
n ≥ s′′n, then GER(n, s′n)  GER(n, s′′n).
Thus, by (155) (165) and [12, Fact 3] on the transitivity of
graph coupling, we can set sn =
(Pnxn
2)q
q! ·
[
1 − o( 1lnn)] to
have Hq(n, Pn, xn) 1−o(1) GER(n, sn), so that Lemma 6 is
proved.
F. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 on minimum degree in q-composite random
key graphs (Restated). For a q-composite random key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn), if there is a sequence φn with limn→∞ φn ∈
[−∞,∞] such that
1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pn
q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ φn
n
, (166)
then under
Pn =
{
Ω(n), for q = 1,
ω
(
n2−
1
q (lnn)2+
1
q
)
, for q ≥ 2, (167)
we have
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least k. ]
= e−
e− limn→∞ φn
(k−1)! (168)
=

0, if limn→∞ φn = −∞, (169a)
1, if limn→∞ φn =∞, (169b)
e−
e−φ
∗
(k−1)! , if limn→∞ φn = φ∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). (169c)
We will use Lemma 7 below to establish Lemma 2.
Lemma 7 (Minimum degree in the intersection of a
q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and an
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, sn), a result presented in
our work [41]). For Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GER(n, sn) being the
intersection of a q-composite random key graphGq(n,Kn, Pn)
and an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, sn), with bq,n denoting
the edge probability of a q-composite random key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) so that bq,n × sn is the edge probability of
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GER(n, sn), if there is a sequence ϕn with
limn→∞ ϕn ∈ [−∞,∞] such that
bq,n × sn = lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ ϕn
n
, (170)
then it holds under Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) that
lim
n→∞
P
[
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GER(n, sn)
has a minimum degree at least k.
]
= e−
e− limn→∞ ϕn
(k−1)! (171)
=

0, if limn→∞ ϕn = −∞, (172a)
1, if limn→∞ ϕn =∞, (172b)
e−
e−ϕ
∗
(k−1)! , if limn→∞ ϕn = ϕ∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). (172c)
Lemma 7 is Theorem 1 of in our work [41]. Setting sn = 1,
we have Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GER(n, sn) = Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and
use Lemma 7 to obtain the following Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 (Minimum degree in a q-composite random
key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)). With bq,n denoting the edge
probability of a q-composite random key graphGq(n,Kn, Pn),
if there is a sequence ϕn with limn→∞ ϕn ∈ [−∞,∞] such
that
bq,n =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ ϕn
n
, (173)
then it holds under Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) that
lim
n→∞
P[Gq(n,Kn, Pn) has a minimum degree at least k. ]
= e−
e− limn→∞ ϕn
(k−1)! (174)
=

0, if limn→∞ ϕn = −∞, (175a)
1, if limn→∞ ϕn =∞, (175b)
e−
e−ϕ
∗
(k−1)! , if limn→∞ ϕn = ϕ∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). (175c)
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Note that the property of minimum degree being at least k
is monotone increasing. For any monotone increasing property
I, the probability that a spanning subgraph (resp., supergraph)
of graph G has I is at most (resp., at least) the probability of
G having I. Therefore, from Lemma 3 on Page 12, we can
introduce an extra condition |φn| = o(lnn) to prove Lemma
2. Hence, to use Lemma 8 for proving Lemma 2, we only
need to show that under the conditions of Lemma 2 along
with the extra condition |φn| = o(lnn), then the conditions
of Lemma 8 all hold and limn→∞ ϕn = limn→∞ φn.
Specifically, we only need to show under (166) (167),
limn→∞ φn ∈ [−∞,∞] and |φn| = o(lnn), we have
Kn = ω(1),
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), and the sequence ϕn defined by
(174) satisfies |ϕn−φn| = o(1) so that whenever limn→∞ φn
exists, limn→∞ ϕn also exists and limn→∞ ϕn = limn→∞ φn.
The rest of the proof is straightforward. Specifically, we
use (166) and |φn| = o(lnn) to have 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
=
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+φn
n =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn±o(lnn)
n ∼ lnnn ,
implying Kn
2
Pn
= Θ
(
( lnnn )
1/q
)
, which along with (167) further
implies
{
Kn = Ω(
√
lnn ) = ω(1), for q = 1,
Kn = ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q
)
= ω(1), for q ≥ 2, .
Then under the just proved{
Kn = Ω(
√
lnn ) = ω(1), for q = 1,
Kn = ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q
)
= ω(lnn), for q ≥ 2,
and Kn
2
Pn
= Θ
(
( lnnn )
1/q
)
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, we use
Property (ii) of Lemma 9 below to obtain
bq,n =
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q × [1 ± o( 1lnn)], which along with the
condition 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
= lnn+(k−1) ln lnn±o(lnn)n implies that the
sequence ϕn defined by (174) satisfies |ϕn−φn| = o(1). This
further means that whenever limn→∞ φn exists, limn→∞ ϕn
also exists and limn→∞ ϕn = limn→∞ φn. Thus, we have
shown that under the conditions of Lemma 2 along with the
extra condition |φn| = o(lnn), then the conditions of Lemma
8 all hold and limn→∞ ϕn = limn→∞ φn. Then we can
use Lemma 8 to obtain Lemma 2 with the extra condition
|φn| = o(lnn). From Lemma 3 on Page 12, we further
establish Lemma 2 regardless of |φn| = o(lnn).
G. An asymptotic expression for the edge probability of a q-
composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
We present Lemma 9 below, which provides asymptotic
expressions of the edge probability bq,n of a q-composite
random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Recall that a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
models the topology of a secure sensor network with n
nodes working under the q-composite scheme. Let Vn =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} represent the n nodes. In the q-composite
scheme, each node vi selects Kn distinct cryptographic keys
uniformly at random from the same pool Pn consisting of Pn
keys, and two nodes can establish a secure link only if they
have at least q key(s) in common. For each node vi, the set
of its Kn different keys is denoted by Si, and is referred
to as the key ring of node vi. Then graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
to model the network topology is defined on the node set
Vn such that any two different nodes vi and vj possessing
at least q key(s) in common (such event is denoted by Γij )
have an edge in between. With Sij defining as Si ∩ Sj , event
Γij equals
[|Sij | ≥ q], where |A| with A as a set means
the cardinality of A. With bq,n denoting the edge probability
of a q-composite random key graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), we have
bq,n = P[Γij ] = P[|Sij | ≥ q] =
∑Kn
u=q P[|Sij | = u].
Lemma 9. The following two properties hold, where bq,n
denotes the edge probability of a q-composite random key
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn):
(i) If Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), then
bq,n =
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q × [1± o(1)]; i.e., bq,n ∼ 1q!(Kn2Pn )q .
(ii) If
{
Kn = ω(1), for q = 1,
Kn = ω(lnn), for q ≥ 2,
and Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, then
bq,n =
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q × [1± o( 1lnn)].
Proof of Lemma 9:
1) Proving Property (i) of Lemma 9:
We prove Property (i) of Lemma 9 below. We simplify Si∩
Sj by writing it as Sij . Clearly, Pn ≥ 2Kn for all n sufficiently
large, due to Kn
2
Pn
= o(1). Given bq,n =
∑Kn
u=q P[|Sij | = u],
Property (i) of Lemma 9 holds once we establish the following
(176) and (177):
P[|Sij | = q] ∼ (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q
, (176)
and
P[|Sij | = q] ∼
Kn∑
u=q
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u]. (177)
We will first establish (176) by providing an upper bound
and a lower bound for P[|Sij | = q], respectively.
Given Pn ≥ 2Kn (which holds for all n sufficiently large
given the condition Kn
2
Pn
= o(1)), we derive that for u =
0, 1, . . . ,Kn,
P[|Sij | = u] =
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn −Kn
Kn − u
)/(Pn
Kn
)
. (178)
Setting u as q in (178), it is clear that
P[|Sij |=q] = 1
q!
[
Kn!
(Kn − q)!
]2
· (Pn −Kn)!
(Pn − 2Kn + q)! ·
(Pn −Kn)!
Pn!
.
(179)
For the upper bound on P[|Sij | = q], using (179) and
Kn
2
Pn−Kn = o(1) which holds from
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), and applying
the fact that 1 + x ≤ ex for any real x, we have
P[|Sij | = q]
≤ (q!)−1Kn2dPnKn−q(Pn −Kn)−Kn
= (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q[
1 +Kn/(Pn −Kn)
]Kn
≤ (q!)−1(Kn2/Pn)qe Kn2Pn−Kn (180)
≤ (q!)−1(Kn2/Pn)q · [1 + o(1)]. (181)
For the part of finding the lower bound, we employ (179),
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and
(
1− 2KnPn
)Kn → 1 as n→∞ which follows
by Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and [5, Fact 3]. We also use (Kn−q)
2
Pn−2Kn ∼
Kn
2
Pn
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due to Kn = ω(q) by Kn = ω(1), and Pn = ω(Kn) by
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1). Therefore,
P[|Sij | = q]
≥ (q!)−1(Kn − q)2d(Pn − 2Kn)Kn−qPn−Kn
= (q!)−1
[
(Kn − q)2/(Pn − 2Kn)
]q · (1− 2Kn/Pn)Kn
(182)
∼ (q!)−1(Kn2/Pn)q; (183)
i.e., (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q · [1 − o(1)] is a lower bound for
P[|Sij | = q]. Then (176) follows from (181) and (183).
Below we focus on proving (177). From (178), for u ≥ q,
P[|Sij | = u]/P[|Sij| = q]
=q!(u!)−1
[u−q−1∏
r=0
(Kn − q − r)
]/[u−q−1∏
r=0
(Pn − 2Kn + u− r)
]
≤[(u− q)!]−1(Kn2/Pn)u−q.
Setting t := u− q and using Kn2Pn = o(1), we obtain (177) by{ Kn∑
u=q
P[|Sij | = q]
}/
P[|Sij | = q]
≤
∞∑
t=0
[
t!−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)t]
= eKn
2/Pn → 1, as n→∞.
(184)
Property (i) of Lemma 9 is completed with (176) and (177).
2) Proving Property (ii) of Lemma 9:
We prove Property (ii) of Lemma 9 below. We only need to
consider q ≥ 2 here since the case of q = 1 is already proved
by Lemma 8-Property (a) in our work [5].
We simplify Si∩Sj by writing it as Sij . Clearly, Pn ≥ 2Kn
for all n sufficiently large, due to Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
= o(1). We
will use bq,n =
∑Kn
u=q P[|Sij | = u].
From (180), it holds that
P[|Sij | = q] ≤ (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q
e
Kn
2
Pn−Kn . (185)
From (184), it holds that
Kn∑
u=q
P[|Sij | = q] ≤ P[|Sij | = q]× eKn
2/Pn . (186)
Combining (185) and (186), we have
bq,n ≤ (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q
e(
Kn
2
Pn−Kn
+Kn
2/Pn)
= (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q
e2
Kn
2
Pn−Kn . (187)
From Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, we have 2 Kn
2
Pn−Kn = o
(
1
lnn
)
by
considering for all n sufficiently large that 2 Kn
2
Pn−Kn ≤
4Kn
2
Pn
from Kn ≤ 12Pn. We can easily prove ex ≤ 1 + 2x for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 by taking the derivative of ex − 1 − 2x to
investigate its monotonicity. This implies that for a sequence
xn = o
(
1
lnn
)
, we have exn = 1 + o
(
1
lnn
)
. Given the above,
we obtain e2
Kn
2
Pn−Kn = 1 + o
(
1
lnn
)
. Using this in (187), we
have
bq,n ≤ (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q × [1 + o( 1
lnn
)]
. (188)
We can easily prove 1−x ≥ e−2x for 0 ≤ x < 12 by taking
the derivative of 1− x− e−2x to investigate its monotonicity.
Given KnPn ≤
Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, we have KnPn <
1
2 for all n
sufficiently large, which implies(
1− 2Kn/Pn
)Kn ≥ (e−2×2Kn/Pn)Kn
= e−4Kn
2/Pn ≥ 1− 4Kn2/Pn = 1− o
(
1
lnn
)
. (189)
To use (189) in (182), we further evaluate
(Kn − q)2d/(Pn − 2Kn)q . Recall that we only need
to consider q ≥ 2 here since the case of q = 1 is already
proved by Lemma 8-Property (a) in our work [5]. We have the
condition Kn = ω(lnn) for q ≥ 2. Thus, it holds that Kn > q
for all n sufficiently large. Then using [5, Fact 2], we have
1− qKn ×2d ≤ (1−
q
Kn
)2d ≤ 1− qKn ×2d+ 12×
(
q
Kn
)2×(2d)2,
which along with Kn = ω(lnn) implies(
1− q
Kn
)2d
= 1− o
(
1
lnn
)
. (190)
Given KnPn ≤ Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, we have 2KnPn < 1 for all n
sufficiently large. Then using [5, Fact 2], we have 1− 2KnPn ×
q ≤ (1 − 2KnPn )q ≤ 1 − 2KnPn × q + 12 ×
(
2Kn
Pn
)2 × q2, which
along with KnPn ≤
Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
implies(
1− 2Kn
Pn
)q
= 1− o
(
1
lnn
)
. (191)
From (190) and (191), we obtain(
1− qKn
)2d(
1− 2KnPn
)q = 1± o( 1lnn
)
. (192)
The reason is that for two sequences xn and yn satisfying xn =
o
(
1
lnn
)
and yn = o
(
1
lnn
)
, it holds that 1−xn1−yn = 1 ± o
(
1
lnn
)
.
To see this, we have 1−xn1−yn − 1 =
yn−xn
1−yn = ±o
(
1
lnn
)
given
yn − xn ± o
(
1
lnn
)
and limn→∞(1− yn) = 1.
The left hand side of (192) can be written as[
(Kn − q)2/(Pn − 2Kn)
]q/[(
Kn
2/Pn
)q]
. Hence, (192) im-
plies[
(Kn − q)2/(Pn − 2Kn)
]q
=
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q × [1± o( 1
lnn
)]
.
(193)
Using (189) and (193) in (182), and noting that
[
1±o( 1lnn)]×[
1± o( 1lnn)] can also be written as [1± o( 1lnn)], we obtain
bq,n ≥ P[|Sij | = q] ≥ (q!)−1
(
Kn
2/Pn
)q × [1− o( 1
lnn
)]
.
(194)
Property (ii) of Lemma 9 is completed with (188) and (194).
